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Overeating can be automatically triggered by the presence of palatable food.  When presented with an opportunity to consume unlimited chocolate under the guise of a consumer study, chocolate consumption in individuals (n=62) with healthy dietary intentions could be predicted from a psychological measure of cognitive inhibition.  Individuals who were less able to suppress goal-incongruent responses in an established inhibitory task (a) ate more chocolate and (b) had a higher body mass index than others suggesting that these individuals were less able to exert dietary control in the presence of palatable but intention-incongruent foods.  








Although snacks are theoretically supplementary to the main diet, they represent a major source of caloric intake (Summerbell, Moody, Shanks, Stock & Geissler, 1995).  Snack foods are typically highly palatable and ‘energy-dense’ (i.e. they contain many calories for the portion size) but have little nutritional value.  Snacking on energy dense foods is associated with a higher caloric intake and problems in weight control (McCrory, Fuss, McCallum, Yao, Vinken, Hays & Roberts, 1999; Conner & Norman, 1996).
	What drives overconsumption of energy-dense snacks?  Animal models of eating behaviour suggest that simply increasing the availability of preferred, highly palatable foods leads to overeating (Tordoff, 2002).  In Western society, energy-dense snacks are readily available in a vast array of food and non-food outlets and can be purchased through vending machines at times and locations where other foods cannot.  This ready availability of highly palatable but unhealthy foods means that consumers attempting to eat healthily must constantly choose between effortfully enacting their healthy intentions and effortlessly indulging in palatable but unhealthy snack foods.  
	Hofmann, Friese & Strack (2009) describe such instances of temptation as tug-of-war conflicts between impulses and self-control.  Impulses to indulge are aimed at short-term gratification and, unless challenged, can operate largely without conscious awareness.  Impulses are thought to arise from the automatic activation of associative networks linking behaviours to known outcomes, and operate unless effortfully suppressed by the conscious activation of a higher-level, goal-oriented system (Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
	In such a tug-of-war between impulses and self control, the behavioural outcome will depend on the relative strength of activation of each system.  While limited control resources would be expected to bias behaviour in the direction of the impulsive system, plentiful control resources should bias behaviour in the direction of higher-order goals as the resources needed to suppress the automatic response pattern would be available.  If this is the case, then individual differences in the strength and availability of cognitive control resources should be related to whether or not people choose to eat in line with their dietary intentions on presentation of palatable but intention-incongruent foods.  
	Cognitive or ‘executive’ control processes are the higher order processes responsible for the planning, initiation, sequencing, and monitoring of complex goal directed behaviour (Royall et al, 2002).  At the group level, adults with elevated body mass index and obese children and adults have been shown to exhibit weak executive control (Gunstad, Paul, Cohen, Tate, Spitznagel & Gordon, 2007;  Braet, Claus, Verbeken & van Vlierberghe, 2007; Cserjesi, Luminet, Molnar, & Lenard, 2007; Cserjesi, Luminet, Poncelet & Lenard, 2009)  suggesting that poor executive functioning is related at some level to dietary behaviour.  
	The few studies examining links between executive control and dietary behaviour at the individual level suggest that individual differences in executive control are indeed predictably related to whether or not people eat in line with their intentions.  Hall, Fong, Epp, & Elias (2008) found that people with good executive control were more likely to eat the amount of fruit and vegetables they intended than those with weak executive control, and data from our own lab (Allan, Johnston & Campbell, under revision) has demonstrated that the discrepancy between intended and actual consumption of both fruit and vegetables and high calorie snacks over several days can be prospectively predicted from individual differences in executive control.  
	While this previous work has focussed on the role of executive control in the implementation of intentional eating behaviours, the present study turns attention to the suppression of ‘unintentional’ eating behaviours, and specifically to the role of cognitive inhibition in suppressing eating that conflicts with dietary intentions.  In today’s obesogenic environment, where palatable, high calorie foods are readily available, successful dietary control may rest largely on the ability to inhibit or resist indulgence in intention-incongruent eating.  






Participants:  62 University students (6M, 56F, Mean age= 20.4 years, SD=7.1 years) who reported intending to avoid high calorie snacks participated in the study in return for course credit.  Sample size was based on detecting an effect size of 0.19 (Allan et al, under revision) in a regression analysis with 3 predictors, ά=0.05, β=0.20 (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992).

Procedure:  Participants attended a 1 hour laboratory session ostensibly about ‘perceptions of ethically produced consumer products’.  Test sessions all took place between 2-4pm so that hunger would be relatively similar across participants, however current hunger/satiation were not measured in order to avoid alerting participants to the dietary focus of the study.
	Snacking intentions were measured with two items from a filler questionnaire on consumer behaviour:  “I intend to avoid high-calorie snacks between meals”, and the alternately worded “I want to avoid high-calorie snacks between meals” (5-point scoring from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’, α=.93).  
	Participants completed three counterbalanced tasks (Stroop, Tower and Fluency tasks) chosen to tap the components of executive control previously linked to intentional dietary behaviour: inhibition, planning, and cognitive flexibility respectively (Hall et al, 2008; Allan et al, under revision).  All three tasks were taken from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS: Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001).  D-KEFS tasks were used because (a) they are sensitive to small differences in executive functioning having been specifically designed to pick up mild impairments and to discriminate between people scoring near ceiling and floor, and (b) they have been normed against 1,700 healthy individuals, have good test-retest reliability and have been validated in a range of different populations (D-KEFS Technical Manual, 2001; Delis, Kramer, Kaplan & Holdnack, 2004).
	In the Stroop task (inhibition), participants named aloud the colour of both incongruently coloured colour words (e.g. the word “red” printed in blue ink) and coloured patches.  Large differences in response time between the two conditions are indicative of poor inhibition.  In the Tower task (planning), participants moved discs from a ‘start’ position to a predefined ‘goal’ position in as few moves as possible while following multiple rules.  The task was scored out of 30 according to the number of moves required to solve each trial with low scores indicating poor planning.   In the Fluency task (flexibility), participants named as many words as possible in 60 seconds that began with particular letters (F, A, and S), or fitted into a particular category (animals and boy’s names).  Generation of a low number of correct responses is indicative of poor cognitive flexibility.  
	Following completion of the executive tasks, participants were left alone for 10 minutes with four ethically produced fair-trade consumer products (paper, coffee, handcream and chocolate), asked to rate them in terms of consumer appeal, and told to “feel free to sample any of the products on offer”.  The outcome measure was the amount of chocolate consumed by each participant during the task (determined by weighing the chocolate before and after the task).   After participants had been debriefed about the aims of the experiment, they were asked to consent to being weighed and measured so that their BMI could be calculated and included in the study analyses.




On average, participants ate 12g of chocolate each (range: 0 to 45g), and had an average body mass index of 22.6.  The study data is summarised in Table 1.

 [Insert Table 1 here]

As hypothesised, two of the three components of executive control measured were significantly associated with chocolate consumption in individuals who intended to avoid high calorie snacks.  Poorer Stroop performance was associated with greater chocolate consumption (r= .48, p<0.01), as was poorer Fluency performance (r= -.39, p<0.01).  Performance on the Tower task was not significantly associated with chocolate consumption (r= -.22, p=0.09).  Both Stroop and Fluency scores were entered into a multiple regression model with chocolate consumed as the dependent variable to determine their combined effect.   Stroop scores (as the largest correlate, and the subject of our main hypothesis) were entered first, and Fluency scores at the next step.  A summary of the model can be seen in Table 2.  Stroop scores predicted 23% of the variance in chocolate consumption (r2= .23, F (1, 61) =17.92, p<0.01), but Fluency scores did not explain any additional variance (r2change= .03, Fchange(1, 59) =2.23, p=0.14). The relationship between Stroop scores and chocolate consumption can be seen in Figure 1.

[Insert Table 2 about here]
[Insert Fig 1 about here]

Higher Stroop scores (indicating poorer inhibition) were also associated with higher body mass index (BMI) in the 48 participants who consented to being weighed (r= .30, p=0.04).  Scores on the other executive measures did not significantly correlate with BMI.  Chocolate consumption was not significantly correlated with BMI although there was a trend in the data suggesting that those with a higher BMI ate more chocolate during the task (r= .27, p=0.06)​[1]​. 

Discussion
Despite reporting intentions to ‘avoid high calorie snacks’, virtually all participants ate some of the available chocolate in a mock consumer rating task.  More than half ate more than one individual portion, indicating that even allowing for perceived expectations about proper completion of the rating task, the majority failed to behave in line with their reported dietary intentions.   
	Of three different executive control tasks (measuring inhibition, flexibility and planning), only performance on the inhibitory Stroop task explained a significant amount of unique variance in chocolate consumption.  Individuals with poor Stroop scores (i.e. those who were least able to inhibit prepotent but task inappropriate responses) ate more chocolate than those with better Stroop scores.  This finding is in line with our original hypothesis that individual differences in inhibitory ability would be predictably related to degree of ‘unintentional’ eating.   In a sub-group of participants who agreed to be weighed during the study, Stroop performance was also significantly correlated with body mass index.  Heavier participants had weaker inhibition, again in line with the hypothesis that individuals with poor inhibitory control may be less likely to stick to healthy dietary intentions than others.
	These results support previous findings linking individual differences in executive control to the discrepancy between intended and actual dietary behaviour (Hall et al, 2008, Allan et al, under revision), and suggest a potential mechanism underlying reported relationships between executive dysfunction and obesity (Gunstad et al, 2007; Braet et al, 2007; Cserjesi et al, 2007; 2009).  They also extend the literature on ‘intention-behaviour gap’, where intentions about diet typically only explain 18-39% of the variance in actual diet (see Weijzen, de Graaf & Dijksterhuis, 2008 for overview).  Weijzen et al (2008) have suggested that the oft-cited discrepancy between intended and actual dietary behaviour is related to the fact that actual food choices often occur impulsively with little conscious awareness (Wansink & Sobal, 2007).  The present findings concur with this position by providing evidence that the ability to inhibit impulsive reactions is related to consumption of intention-incongruent foods. 
	A further possibility is that inhibitory ability is related to impulsive, unintentional eating through the phenomenon of ‘delayed discounting’.  During decision-making, people typically weight the value of an outcome by the time it will take to achieve, such that distant future consequences are valued less than immediate consequences (Green, Myerson & McFadden, 1997). As eating a palatable but high calorie snack has pleasurable immediate consequences and only long term negative consequences, the present results may also be interpreted as evidence that the behaviour of individuals with poor cognitive inhibition is more likely to be determined by short term than long term consequences. Temporal Self-Regulation Theory (Hall & Fong, 2007) posits that an individual’s ability to engage in intended health behaviours that have short term costs and long term benefits is related in part to their natural self-regulatory capacity (including their ability to inhibit prepotent responses).  In line with this, both people with executive dysfunction and overweight individuals have been shown to display a higher than normal sensitivity to immediate reward contingencies (Hinson, Jameson & Whitney, 2003; Davis, Levitan, Muglia, Bewell & Kennedy, 2004).  
	Planning ability was not found to be related to chocolate consumption in the present study.  This is in contrast to our previous work which demonstrated that planning, inhibition and flexibility are all involved in the process of turning dietary intentions into action (Allan et al, under revision).  However, turning dietary intentions into action (e.g. by eating 5 portions of fruit and vegetables a day) and suppressing behaviours that will contradict healthy dietary intentions (e.g. by abstaining from high calorie snacks) are likely to be two very different behaviours. Volitional behaviour in general is conceptualised as a dual process with both the implementation of intended actions and the ability to inhibit competing actions necessary for successful goal pursuit (Goschke, 2003; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Both aspects of goal pursuit involve executive control, but the specific processes involved in each are likely to differ.  Selection and implementation of actions will rely heavily on the ability to plan ahead and maintain focus.  Ability to suppress behaviour that contradicts intentions on the other hand is likely to be less reliant on planning and more dependent on inhibitory ability.   Thus, we would hypothesise different self-regulatory processes predict (and control) the implementation of intentions to act versus inhibit behaviour. 
	When drawing conclusions from the results of this study, two methodological limitations should be considered.  Firstly, the sample came from a young student population and so the findings need to be replicated in other groups to ensure generalisability.  Secondly, questions about food intake were minimised during the study to conceal the experimental focus on diet from participants. This meant that several variables which could have influenced chocolate consumption at the time of measurement (such as current level of hunger, time since last meal, etc) were not recorded or controlled for.  This should be addressed in further studies so that possible interactions between hunger and strength of inhibitory control can be investigated.

Future Directions
If individuals with good inhibitory control are indeed better able to resist deviating from their intended diet, then improvements in (or reductions in the need for) inhibitory control may improve people’s chances of eating as they had intended.  Research from the field of ‘implementation intentions’ or ‘If-Then plans’ has suggested that simply generating an advance plan in the form “When I encounter X, I will/will not do Y” can compensate for resource related decrements in performance of the Stroop task (Webb & Sheeran, 2003) and improve inhibitory control in individuals with clinical deficits in inhibition (Gawrilow & Gollwitzer, 2008).  Consequently, it is important for future studies to investigate the potential beneficial effect of implementation intentions in individuals with a range of different executive abilities.  Similarly, it seems pertinent to investigate whether public health interventions which operate through the removal of temptation from the environment (e.g. removing vending machines from schools) are more effective in individuals with weak inhibitory control.  
In terms of theoretical development, future research should address how executive control, and in particular cognitive inhibition, relates to other concepts related to dietary self-control such as restrained eating, perceived control and self-efficacy.
In conclusion, the present study found that ability to resist opportunistic snacking is predictably related to individual differences in cognitive inhibition.  Individuals with weak cognitive inhibition who reported intentions to avoid high calorie snacks ate more chocolate when presented with the opportunity to do so than individuals with comparable intentions but strong inhibition.  This is likely to be because those with strong inhibitory control had the cognitive resources necessary to over-ride the impulse to consume palatable but intention-incongruent foods.  








Intention to avoid snacks (1-5, 5=strongly intend) 	62	4.3 (0.6)	3.0 – 5.0   				

Tower task overall score ( /30)	62	18.4 (4.4)	11.0 – 28.0

Stroop score (incongruent-neutral RT in secs)	62	23.9 (9.6)	6.0 – 51.0

Verbal fluency score (No. words generated)	62	73.0 (16.5)	42.0 – 121.0			

Chocolate consumed (grams)	62	12.1 (9.7)	0.0 – 45.0















1	Constant	.46   	2.97		.88			
	Stroop Score	.49   	.12	.48	.00
__________________________________________________________________________________
2	Constant	11.27	7.81		.15
	Stroop Score	.39   	.13	 .38	.01
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^1	  * If BMI and Stroop are both entered into the same regression model (in the 48 participants with BMI information), BMI explains 8% of the variance in chocolate consumption (p=0.06) and Stroop scores add a significant amount of unique variance over and above this (a further 12%, total R2=0.20 p=0.01).
